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SKELETONS IN THE FAMILY MEDICAL CLOSET: ACCESS OF 
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES TO INTEROPERABLE MEDICAL 
RECORDS 
LESLIE P. FRANCIS* 
Achieving the interoperability of electronic health records (EHRs) is a 
matter of urgent public policy discussion.1  Protection for the security, 
privacy, and confidentiality of the information in EHRs is critical to public 
trust in this enterprise.2  Included among privacy concerns is the right of 
individuals to request copies of their medical records.3  Less noticed are the 
implications of interoperability for access to individuals’ medical records by 
their personal representatives.  Access by individuals or their personal 
representatives is not a trivial matter, as Americans age and Medicare 
recipients are encouraged to download information in their EHRs at the 
push of a “Blue Button.”4 
Historically, paper medical records were siloed at the locations of 
providers or organizations creating them.5  State law governed patients’ 
access to medical records, and many states placed significant limits on 
patients’ rights to access their own records.6  All this has changed.  The right 
of patients to access medical records is now enshrined in federal law.  
 
* J.D., University of Utah; Ph.D., philosophy, University of Michigan; Distinguished Professor 
of Law and Philosophy and Alfred C. Emery Professor of Law, University of Utah. 
 1. See, e.g., PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., EXEC. OFF. OF THE 
PRESIDENT, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT REALIZING THE FULL POTENTIAL OF HEALTH INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY TO IMPROVE HEALTHCARE FOR AMERICANS:  THE PATH FORWARD (2010), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/pcast-health-it-report.pdf. 
 2. See NAT’L COMM. ON VITAL & HEALTH STATISTICS, TOWARD ENHANCED INFORMATION 
CAPACITIES FOR HEALTH (2010), available at http://www.ncvhs.hhs.gov/100526concept.pdf. 
 3. The HIPAA Privacy Rule includes this right of access, 45 C.F.R. § 164.524 (2010). 
 4. For a description of the “Blue Button” initiative, see Download My Data/Blue Button, 
MEDICARE.GOV, http://www.medicare.gov/navigation/manage-your-health/personal-health-re 
cords/blue-button-download.aspx?AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1 (last visited June 10, 
2011). 
 5. See, e.g., Leslie P. Francis, The Physician-Patient Relationship and a National Health 
Information Network, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 36, 36-49 (2010). 
 6. See, e.g., Ellen Klugman, Comment, Toward a Uniform Right to Medical Records:  A 
Proposal for a Model Patient Access and Information Practices Statute, 30 UCLA L. REV. 1349, 
1365-68 (1983). 
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Extensive incentives and legal requirements are pushing providers towards 
electronic records with increasingly sophisticated interoperability functions.7 
Before interoperable EHRs, a personal representative accessing the 
medical record of an individual would likely see only paper records 
maintained by the team currently involved in the individual’s care.  Other 
records about that individual would remain in the offices in which they 
originally were created.  For patient care, siloed office records have well-
known disadvantages.8  For privacy, however, the picture is quite different. 
Imagine Mother, age 64, is hospitalized for a stroke and Daughter is her 
health care decision-maker.  Fully interoperable EHRs could include much 
that is not medically relevant to Mother’s current care but that Mother would 
not want or expect Daughter to see.  Records might feature not only 
Mother’s recent medical history, but also her records from her gynecologist, 
including the pregnancy she ended at age 45.  Or, they could include the 
records of Mother’s visits to her internist for treatment for depression after 
Dad’s death a few years back—treatment that Mother had proudly and 
carefully hidden from the rest of the family.  As interoperability becomes 
more robust, metaphorical skeletons in the medical history closet will be 
increasingly on view to personal representatives making health care 
decisions for others.  This confidentiality problem warrants ethical and legal 
attention that it has not yet received. 
The situation of personal representatives, moreover, may be ethically 
complex.  Although personal representatives are charged to act either as the 
individual would have wanted or in the individual’s best interests, personal 
representatives may have important health interests of their own in accessing 
health records.  Daughter may have health interests in understanding the 
circumstances of her conception, circumstances Mother may have wished to 
keep private.9  Information about heritable conditions may be critical to 
other family members’ decisions about their own health care, but family 
 
 7. These incentives are a major part of the federal “stimulus package” investment in 
infrastructure.  See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, §§ 
13001-424, 123 Stat. 115, 226-79 (“HITECH Act”) (2009) (codified in scattered sections of 
42 U.S.C.).  See also The Official Web Site for the Medicare and Medicaid Electronic Health 
Records (EHR) Incentive Programs, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.cms.gov/ehrincentiveprograms/ (last modified May 17, 
2011). 
 8. See, e.g., Nicolas P. Terry & Leslie P. Francis, Ensuring the Privacy and Confidentiality 
of Electronic Health Records, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 681, 691-707 (2007). 
 9. The American Society for Reproductive Medicine recommends, but does not require, 
parents to inform their offspring of their conception by methods of assisted reproduction.  
American Society for Reproductive Medicine, Ethics Committee Report:  Informing Offspring of 
their Conception by Gamete Donation, 81 FERTILITY & STERILITY 527, 527-31 (2004). 
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members are not always willing to share this information.10  Interests of 
personal representatives may be less ethically compelling as well: for 
example, interests in assessing how much Mother’s health care will cost, 
guessing how soon Mother is likely to die, or learning more family gossip.11 
On the other side, Daughter may not want to know some of this 
information, either; some people do not want to know the circumstances of 
their conception or whether they are at risk for certain heritable conditions. 
Additional difficulties are introduced by variations in reasons for and 
selection of personal representatives for health care decision-making.  
“Personal representative,” as used in this article, covers the range of 
individuals who make decisions for others who lack the legal capacity to 
make their own health care decisions.  Personal representatives in this sense 
include parents making health care decisions for their minor children, court-
appointed guardians or conservators making decisions for wards, 
individuals appointed as holders of durable powers of attorney for health 
care, and individuals recognized as decision-makers under state surrogate 
decision making statutes.  In some cases, these personal representatives will 
have been selected by the individuals themselves.  In other cases, there will 
be information available about the individuals’ prior statements about 
preferences, expectations, or choices.  The reasons for incapacity will vary 
too, including minority, cognitive disability (life-long or adult onset), or 
mental illness. 
This article begins by describing current federal law about the rights of 
patients to access their own medical records.  The description pays 
particular attention to restrictions on this right, including psychotherapy 
notes and endangerment.  Federal law gives personal representatives the 
same rights as patients to access records as permitted by state law.  The 
article then analyzes state law rights of access by personal representatives.  
In general, states treat access by personal representatives in all or nothing 
fashion; if there is a right of access, it is the right to access the entire record.  
A few states, however, have considered the problem in more nuanced ways.  
Several states allow patients to use advance directives to structure access to 
records.  Several other states restrict the rights of the personal representative 
to access mental health or substance abuse treatment records.  Some states 
 
 10. There has been considerable discussion in bioethics about the obligations of family 
members to share information about heritable conditions.  See, e.g., David J. Doukas & 
Jessica W. Berg, The Family Covenant and Genetic Testing, 1 AM. J. BIOETHICS 2, 2-10 
(2001) (AJOB Target Article accompanied by many commentaries in the pages following the 
article (pp. 11-34)). 
 11. For a sympathetic discussion of the interests of other family members in the costs or 
burdens of their relatives’ care, see John Hardwig, Is There a Duty to Die?, HASTINGS CTR. 
RPT., Mar./Apr. 1997, at 34. 
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differentiate rights of access of the personal representative depending on 
whether the patient is a person with mental illness or cognitive disability.  
The examples are quite limited, however.  An additional problem is whether 
access rights of the personal representative should differ depending on 
whether the individual represented is a person with mental illness or with 
cognitive disabilities. 
This article provides four recommendations: 
o Advance directive statutes should permit competent patients to 
designate the extent to which their personal representatives 
should have access to interoperable medical records. 
o Absent a directive, the presumption should be that the personal 
representative has access only to records that are needed for 
decision making about the patient’s care. 
o Interoperable medical records should be designed to allow 
special management of sensitive types of medical information 
(such as mental health information or treatment for substance 
abuse).  When patients have identified types of information as 
sensitive, personal representatives should not have access to that 
information except as necessary for emergency care. 
o These principles should apply whether the patient is a person 
with mental illness or a person with cognitive disability.  For 
persons with cognitive disabilities, however, prior preferences 
may be more difficult to ascertain. 
I.  INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS TO ACCESS ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORDS: THE ROLE OF 
FEDERAL LAW 
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) is the 
federal statute governing the privacy and security of certain health 
information.12  Under HIPAA,13 the Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS) issued the HIPAA Privacy Rule.14  In 2009, Congress passed 
the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act 
(HITECH Act).15  Along with extensive incentives for use of health 
information technology, the HITECH Act also enhances protections for 
 
 12. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub. L. No. 104-
191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.). 
 13. Id. § 264. 
 14. 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 162, 164 (2010). 
 15. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, §§ 
13001-424, 123 Stat. 115, 226-79 (“HITECH Act”) (2009) (codified in scattered sections of 
42 U.S.C.). 
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health information security and privacy.16  HIPAA preempts conflicting state 
law, but not consistent state laws that protect privacy more stringently.17  For 
several purposes important to this article and discussed below, particularly 
the rights of personal representatives, HIPAA largely defers to state law. 
The HIPAA Privacy Rule incorporates many (but not all) of Fair 
Information Practice Principles (FIPPs)  which are widely accepted as 
guidelines for the protection of identifying information about individuals.18  
Core to FIPPs are the rights of individuals to know what information about 
them is being collected and how it is being used.  Individuals must also be 
able to correct mistakes in personally identifiable information about them 
held by others. 
Following these FIPPs principles, the HIPAA Privacy Rule provides to the 
individual a right of access to “protected health information.”19  An 
individual’s request for disclosure of medical records is a required disclosure 
under HIPAA.20  This right is limited, however, to what is called a 
“designated record set.”  Information in the designated record set includes 
medical records, billing records; “enrollment, payment, claims adjudication, 
and case or medical management record systems maintained by or for a 
health plan;” or other information used, in whole or in part, to make 
decisions about individuals.21 Of interest to individuals, the designated 
record set as thus defined does not include data collected for research, data 
collected for peer review, or data collected for quality improvement. 
 
 16. Id. §§ 13400-24. 
 17. HIPAA § 264(c). 
 18. FIPPs were introduced in 1973 by the U.S. Department of Health, Education and 
Welfare in a proposal for practices to govern automated personal data systems.  See 
RECORDS, COMPUTERS AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS:  REPORT OF THE SECRETARY’S ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE ON AUTOMATED PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMS (1973), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/ 
DATACNCL/1973privacy/tocprefacemembers.htm.  In 1980, the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) adopted the “Guidelines Governing the Protection of 
Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data,” which include core FIPPs.  See Guidelines 
Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, ORG. FOR ECON. 
COOP. & DEV., http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,3343,en_2649_34255_1815186_1_1 
_1_1,00.html.  The European Union’s data protection directive, Directive 95/46/EC, likewise 
rests on FIPPs.  See Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 24 
October 1995, OFFICIAL J. EUR. COMMUNITY, no. L. 281, 1995, at 31, 31-39, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/95-46-ce/dir1995-46_part1_en.pdf.  For a 
general history of FIPPs, see ROBERT GELLMAN, FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES:  A BASIC HISTORY 
(2011), available at http://bobgellman.com/rg-docs/rg-FIPshistory.pdf. 
 19. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2010).  “Protected health information” is a HIPAA term of art.  
For purposes of this article, it can be defined as information that is about health, individually 
identifiable, and created or possessed by a health care provider, health care plan, or health 
care clearinghouse. 
 20. Id. § 164.502(a)(2)(i). 
 21. Id. § 164.501. 
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The HITECH Act enhanced patients’ ease of access to health 
information in electronic form.  If requests are “clear, conspicuous, and 
specific,” individuals may request copies of information in EHRs in electronic 
form sent to designated entities.22  This provision allows patients to request 
copies of their information to be sent directly to personal health records, for 
example.  It does not, however, expand the information to which individuals 
have access beyond the designated record set. 
The HIPAA Privacy Rule imposes important limits on patients’ rights of 
access.  The HITECH Act does not change these limits.  These important 
limits on the right of access include psychotherapy notes and disclosures that 
might cause danger to individuals themselves or to others. 
“Psychotherapy notes” are given special protection under the Privacy 
Rule, both from disclosures to the patient and to third parties.  Disclosure of 
psychotherapy notes to third parties requires specific authorization on the 
part of the patient, with exceptions enumerated in the Privacy Rule.23  
Psychotherapy notes, however, are a quite limited set of mental health 
information.  Psychotherapy notes include contents of conversations during 
therapy sessions, provided these are separated from the rest of the 
individual’s medical record.  They exclude information about prescription 
medication and monitoring, types and frequency of treatment, clinical test 
results, and summary accounts of the patient’s status (including “diagnosis, 
functional status, the treatment plan, symptoms, prognosis, and progress to 
date”).24  Although it includes “clinical tests,” the present definition does not 
include results of testing that is part of a mental health evaluation.25  Thus, 
much mental health information that patients might want to protect is not 
 
 22. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, §§ 
13001-424, 123 Stat. 115, 226-79 (“HITECH Act”) (2009) (codified in scattered sections of 
42 U.S.C.). 
 23. 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(a)(2) (2010).  There are exceptions to this:  use of the notes by 
their originator for treatment, use for training purposes, and use by the treating entity for 
defense in a legal action.  Id. § 164.508(a)(2)(i).  Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996), 
recognizes a federal psychotherapist-patient privilege.  Jaffee influenced the decision to give 
special protection to psychotherapy notes in HIPAA, rather than extending special protections 
to many types of sensitive information.  Psychotherapy Notes, 65 Fed. Reg. 82,652 (Dec. 28, 
2000).  For an excellent discussion of the HIPAA Privacy Rule’s treatment of psychotherapy 
notes, see Daniel B. Lord, The Pitfalls of HIPAA:  The Sticky Wicket of Psychotherapy Notes, 29 
ALASKA BAR RAG, July-Sept. 2005, at 34-35. 
 24. 45 C.F.R. § 164.501 (2010). 
 25. See, e.g., APAPO Builds on Work to Protect Psychological Testing Data, AM. PSYCH. 
ASS’N PRACTICE ORG. (Oct. 27, 2010), http://www.apapracticecentral.org/update/2010/10-
27/testing-data.aspx.  For an overview of the importance of protecting privacy in mental 
health treatment with particular attention to the inadequacies of HIPAA, see Paul S. 
Appelbaum, Privacy in Psychiatric Treatment:  Threats and Responses, 159 AM. J. PSYCH. 
1809, 1809-18 (2002). 
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included within the special HIPAA protection for psychotherapy notes.  The 
HITECH Act requires a study of this definition of psychotherapy notes with 
respect to test results that are part of a mental health evaluation.26  The 
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) is 
currently conducting this study in cooperation with the Office for Civil Rights 
(OCR) within HHS.27 
The Privacy Rule lists exceptions to the requirement of specific patient 
authorization for the use or disclosure of psychotherapy notes.  These 
exceptions include use by the originator of the notes for treatment purposes 
and use or disclosure by the covered entity for its own training purposes.28  
Other exceptions include disclosures to HHS for review of compliance with 
HIPAA29 or for oversight of the health care provider originating the notes.30 
These uses, while not uncontroversial, could be justified in terms of the 
interests of patients in  receiving good care.31  However, other disclosures of 
psychotherapy notes permitted without patient authorization are not at all in 
the interests of patients.  It is perhaps predictable that permitted disclosures 
would include defense of the covered entity against a suit brought by the 
individual.32 Disclosures of psychotherapy notes permitted without 
authorization include disclosures required by law if the conditions applicable 
to the legal purpose are met,33 disclosures of information about decedents 
to coroners and medical examiners,34 and disclosures needed to avoid a 
 
 26. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 
13424(f), 123 Stat. 115, 226-79 (“HITECH Act”) (2009) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 
17954). 
 27. SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., PUBLIC DISCUSSION ON 
CONFIDENTIALITY AND PRIVACY ISSUES RELATED TO PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING DATA (2010) 
[hereinafter PUBLIC DISCUSSION ON CONFIDENTIALITY], available at http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/ 
privacy/hipaa/understanding/special/ebrochure-la.pdf. 
 28. 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(a)(2)(i)(A)–(B) (2010).  “Covered entity” is a HIPAA-defined term 
meaning health care provider, health plan, or health care clearinghouse.  Id. §160.103.  
Under this provision, the entity within which the patient was treated may use the notes for 
training purposes, but the notes may not be disclosed outside the institution for similar 
purposes. 
 29. Id. § 164.502(a)(2)(ii). 
 30. Id. § 164.512(d). 
 31. For a discussion of the controversies involved in the use of patients’ records without 
authorization in quality assurance, see HEALTH CARE QUALITY IMPROVEMENT:  ETHICAL AND 
REGULATORY ISSUES (Bruce Jennings et al. eds., 2007). 
 32. 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(a)(2)(i)(C) (2010). 
 33. Id. § 164.512(a). 
 34. Id. § 164.512(g) (2010).  These disclosures must be for the purpose of identifying a 
decedent, determining cause of death, or fulfilling other legal duties.  Id. § 164.512(g).  In 
promulgating the Privacy Rule, HHS explained this exception as follows: 
In general, we have severely limited disclosures of psychotherapy notes without the 
individual’s authorization.  One case where the information may prove invaluable, but 
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serious and imminent threat to health or safety.35  The category of 
disclosures permitted without authorization because they are required by law 
includes reports of abuse, neglect, or domestic violence.36  The category 
also includes disclosures for judicial and administrative proceedings, 
including disclosures in response to judicial orders, subpoenas, or other 
legal processes.37 
The special protection HIPAA gives psychotherapy notes extends to 
protecting the information from patients themselves.  That is, HIPAA 
excludes psychotherapy notes from patients’ own rights of access.38 The 
study of whether to include test results within the definition asks specifically 
whether patients “need to know, or have an interest in, inspecting or 
obtaining a copy of such information?”39 In comparison to protecting 
mental health treatment information from access by third parties, surprisingly 
little has been written about shielding such records from access by patients 
themselves.  Perhaps the justification is paternalistic: patients would find 
such records disturbing.  It seems likely that this is a core question in the 
study of patient access to results of mental health testing.  Perhaps the 
concern is that access to such records would undermine the efficacy of the 
therapeutic relationship.  Another justification—although not centered in the 
interests of patients—would be the practical interests of treating 
 
authorization by the individual is impossible and authorization by a surrogate is 
potentially contraindicated, is in the investigation of the death of  the individual.  The 
final rule allows for disclosures to coroners or medical examiners in this limited case. 
65 Fed. Reg. 82,650, 82,654 (Dec. 28, 2000).  Presumably, the concern about authorization 
from surrogates here is that the surrogate may be implicated in the death. 
 35. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(j)(1)(i) (2010).  For these disclosures, the covered entity must in 
good faith believe that the use or disclosure is needed to avert “a serious and imminent threat 
to the health or safety of a person or the public” and that the disclosure is to a person 
reasonably able to avert the threat (including the target).  Id. § 164.512(j)(1)(i).  This is 
essentially the “Tarasoff” exception to the authorization requirement.  See Tarasoff v. Regents 
of the University of California, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 20 (Cal. 1976). 
 36. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(c) (2010).  The disclosure must be required by law, and limited 
to the relevant legal requirements).  Id. § 164.512(c)(i).  Either the individual must agree to 
the disclosure, or the covered entity must either believe the disclosure is needed to avert 
serious harm (to the individual or other victims) or (if the individual is incapacitated and 
cannot give consent) represent that the disclosed information will not be used against the 
individual and that without disclosure immediate law enforcement activities will be adversely 
affected.  Id. § 164.512(c)(iii)(A)–(B). 
 37. Id. § 164.512(e).  For disclosures not supported by a court order, the covered entity 
must also receive “satisfactory assurance” that “reasonable efforts” have been made to give 
notice to the individual.  Id. at § 164.512(e)(ii)(A). 
 38. Id. § 164.524(a)(i). 
 39. PUBLIC DISCUSSION ON CONFIDENTIALITY, supra note 27.  The study also asks whether 
third parties may have an interest in obtaining this information.  Id. 
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professionals in not having their notes open to review by their patients.40  
The denial of a patient’s request for access to psychotherapy notes is not 
subject to review.41 
Another important justification for denial of a patient’s request to access 
records is endangerment of the patient or others.42  The judgment of 
endangerment is a professional judgment to be made by a licensed health 
care professional.  Access can also be denied if a record contains 
information about someone else that might endanger them.43  An example 
would be a medical record that contains judgments about the suspected 
source of an infection, when this information would not otherwise be 
available to the patient.  Denials of access on grounds of endangerment are 
reviewable.44 
As mentioned above, HIPAA preempts contrary but not more stringent 
state laws about privacy and security.  The exact parameters of preemption 
are explained in the regulations.  State laws are “contrary” to HIPAA if 
covered entities “would find it impossible” to comply with both the federal 
and the state requirements.45  They are also “contrary” if the state law 
“stands as an obstacle” to the achievement of the purposes of the statutory 
requirement to protect privacy46 or to the purposes of the administrative 
simplification provisions of the Social Security Act.47  State law provisions are 
“more stringent” if they prohibit an otherwise permitted disclosure, unless 
the disclosure is to HHS or to the individual.48  They are also “more 
stringent” if they permit individuals greater rights to access or amend their 
health information, or if they permit individuals to access more information 
than permitted by the Privacy Rule.49  Thus states may expand the individual 
right of access to health information, but may not contract it.  States may 
 
 40. However, neither the American Psychiatric Association’s annotations to the Principles 
of Medical Ethics nor ethics opinions treat confidentiality and disclosure of medical records to 
patients.  See, e.g., AM. PSYCH. ASS’N, THE PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS (2010 ed. 2010), 
available at http://www.psych.org/MainMenu/PsychiatricPractice/Ethics/ResourcesStandards/ 
Principles-of-Medical-Ethics-2010-Edition.aspx?FT=.pdf. 
 41. 45 C.F.R. § 164.524(a)(2)(i) (2010). 
 42. Id. § 164.524(a)(3)(i). 
 43. Id. § 164.524(a)(3)(ii).  This does not apply if the other person is a health care 
professional. 
 44. Id. § 164.524(a)(3)-(4).  Impartial review procedures are required. 
 45. 45 C.F.R. § 160.202 (2010). 
 46. Id. § 160.202(2); Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 
(HIPAA), Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 264, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320d–2 
note). 
 47. 45 C.F.R. § 160.202 (2010); Social Security Act, Title XI, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1301–
1320d-8 (2009). 
 48. 45 C.F.R. § 160.202 (2010). 
 49. Id. § 160.202. 
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therefore expand the individual right of access to psychotherapy notes 
despite the exception in the Privacy Rule.50 
II.  HIPAA AND THE RIGHTS OF PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES 
In general, HIPAA treats personal representatives as individuals 
themselves would be treated.51  This means that personal representatives 
recognized under state law would have all the rights that individuals 
themselves would have to access medical records.  For adults and 
emancipated minors, HIPAA simply defers to determinations of authority 
under applicable law.52 For deceased individuals, HIPAA also defers to state 
law governing the authority of personal representatives.53 
For unemancipated minors, the interplay between HIPAA and state law 
is more complex and more protective of the minor’s confidentiality.  HIPAA 
does not defer to state law determinations of authority to access records in 
cases in which the minor’s consent to treatment is sufficient under state law, 
the minor consents to the treatment, and the minor has not requested that 
the person seeking access be treated as a personal representative.54  An 
example would be state laws allowing minors to consent to treatment for 
sexually transmitted diseases; in such cases, HIPAA would not defer to state 
laws allowing access to parents unless the minor has requested that the 
parent be treated as a personal representative.  HIPAA also does not defer 
to state law cases in which the unemancipated minor has the legal right to 
obtain treatment without the consent of another, and has consented to the 
treatment or the treatment has been authorized by law.55 Abortion is an 
example; HIPAA would protect the record even if state law were to grant 
parents the right of access.  HIPAA also protects the record of an 
unemancipated minor when the personal representative of the minor has 
 
 50. For a state explanation of this, see HIPAA Preemption Charts, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF 
HEALTH (last updated Oct. 15, 2002), http://www.health.state.ny.us/nysdoh/hipaa/hipaa 
_preemption_charts.htm. 
 51. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(g)(1) (2010). 
 52. Id. § 164.502(g)(2). 
 53. Id. § 164.502(g)(4).  The American Psychiatric Association has noted that there may 
be important differences between the ethical and legal rights of personal representatives to 
access the records of decedents.  See AM. PSYCH. ASS’N, OPINIONS OF THE ETHICS COMMITTEE 
ON THE PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS 24, 25 (2009), available at http://www.psych.org/Main 
Menu/PsychiatricPractice/Ethics/ResourcesStandards/OpinionsofPrinciples.aspx.  APA Ethics 
Op. D.4.h responds to an inquiry from a treating psychiatrist of a patient who committed 
suicide.  The psychiatrist asks whether there is an obligation to release records to the 
apparently abusing father who requested the records as executor of his son’s estate.  The 
opinion concludes that the father does not have an ethical right to the patient’s records, 
although whether the father has a legal right is a different question.  Id. 
 54. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(g)(3)(i)(A) (2010). 
 55. Id. § 164.502(g)(3)(i)(B). 
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assented to a confidentiality agreement with respect to the health care 
service in question.56  When the parent of an unemancipated minor is not 
the personal representative of the minor, and there is no applicable state or 
other law concerning access, decisions about access by the parent should 
be made according to professional judgment by a licensed health care 
provider.57 
In situations of possible abuse, neglect or endangerment, however, 
HIPAA does not defer to state law concerning access of personal 
representatives to records.58  The covered entity must have a “reasonable 
belief” that the individual has been or may be the subject of domestic 
violence or abuse or that regarding someone as the personal representative 
would endanger the individual, and must exercise “professional judgment” 
that access to the information is not in the best interest of the individual.59 
III.  RIGHTS TO ACCESS RECORDS UNDER STATE LAW 
State laws vary widely in what they provide—or fail to provide—about 
the rights of individuals or their personal representatives to access medical 
records.  States also vary in whether they provide any formal mechanisms for 
individuals to use to restrict the rights of their personal representatives to 
view some or all of their medical record.  In addition, many state statutes in 
this area are not, to say the least, models of clarity.  The discussion that 
follows is not intended as an exhaustive presentation of every state’s laws.  
Rather, the goals of the discussion are to describe the remarkable variety 
among state laws in this area and to call attention to significant gaps in 
confidentiality protections when personal representatives have the right to 
access medical records. 
A. A Preliminary Note about Minors 
Many states require special handling for the records of unemancipated 
minors.  Some states are highly protective of these minors’ rights to shield 
their records from parents or others who may make decisions for them.  
New York, for example, states that minors over the age of twelve may be 
notified of a request for disclosure of medical records; if the minor objects to 
the disclosure, the provider may deny the request.60  In New York, providers 
also may refuse access by a parent or guardian on determining that the 
information would have a detrimental effect on the provider’s professional 
 
 56. Id. § 164.502(g)(3)(i)(C). 
 57. Id. § 164.502(g)(3)(ii)(C). 
 58. Id. § 164.502(g)(5). 
 59. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(g)(5) (2010). 
 60. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 18(3)(c) (McKinney 2002 & Supp. 2010). 
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relationship with the minor, the minor’s care, or the minor’s relationship with 
parents or guardian.61 
In addition, some states provide special protections for particular types 
of information concerning minors.  For example, in Michigan, minors age 
fourteen or older may receive outpatient mental health services without the 
consent or knowledge of their parents or guardians.62  When a minor 
receives these services, the parent or guardian may not be informed without 
the minor’s consent, unless the mental health professional determines there 
is a compelling need for disclosure because of a substantial probability of 
harm to the minor or to another.”63  In Illinois, a parent or guardian of a 
child who is at least twelve but not yet eighteen may only inspect or copy 
mental health records if the patient child is “informed and does not object 
or if the therapist does not find that there are compelling reasons for 
denying the access.”64  In New York, information concerning a minor’s 
abortion or treatment for venereal disease may not be released to parents or 
guardians.65 
Because state laws about minors vary so greatly and introduce an 
additional layer of complexity, this article focuses on access to medical 
records concerning adults and emancipated minors.  However, the need 
under state law for special handling of records concerning sensitive 
information about minors poses difficulties for the introduction of systems 
allowing minors or their parents access to these records electronically.66 
Addressing these issues for adults may provide methods that can be helpful 
in the case of minors as well. 
B. Similar Treatment for Access Rights of Principals and Access Rights of 
Personal Representatives 
Some states have laws that give individuals or their personal 
representatives rights to access medical records but are silent concerning 
rights under guardianship or advance directive statutes.  These states 
 
 61. Id. § 18(2)(c). 
 62. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 330.1707(1) (2011). 
 63. Id. § 330.1707(1)-(2).  These services may not include pregnancy termination or 
psychotropic drugs.   Services should promote the relationship to the parent or guardian and 
not undermine the values instilled in this relationship.  These services are also limited in time 
or number of visits.  Id. § 330.1707. 
 64. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/4(1), (3) (LexisNexis 2010).  Interestingly, there is no similar 
limit for the holder of a DPA for mental health treatment.  740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 110/4(7) 
(West 2010). 
 65. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 17 (McKinney 2002 & Supp. 2010). 
 66. NCVHS Committee on Privacy, Confidentiality, and Security: AAP Response to 
Committee Questions, NAT’L COMM. ON VITAL & HEALTH STATISTICS, http://www.ncvhs.hhs.gov/ 
100615p07.pdf (last visited June 16, 2011). 
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apparently do not differentiate between the rights of individuals themselves 
or the rights of their representatives.  Kentucky is an example, requiring that 
health care providers furnish a copy of a medical record upon the written 
request of a patient, the patient’s attorney, or the patient’s authorized 
representative.67  The Kentucky guardianship statute authorizes the guardian 
to consent to medical care but makes no mention of medical records.68  The 
advance directive statute likewise is silent about access to medical records 
by an authorized surrogate decision maker.69 Several other states have 
similar non-differentiating statutes.70  Vermont has statutes that are silent but 
with the additional twist that individuals may use advance directives to 
specify others in addition to their agents who may receive health records.71 
Another variation is silence in some statutes but the right to differentiate in 
others; in Utah, for example, there is no mention of medical information in 
the guardianship statute72 but the advance directive statute allows the 
principal to limit the agent’s right to receive medical information.73 
Some state statutes specify that guardians or holders of the durable 
power of attorney (DPA) have the same rights as individuals would have to 
access their medical records.  For example, Alabama law states that 
“[r]equests for copies of any medical records must be accompanied by a 
current valid duly executed authorization and release which has been signed 
by the recipient or by one legally authorized to act on behalf of the 
recipient.”74 The Alabama advance directive and default surrogate decision-
 
 67. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 422.317(1) (LexisNexis 2005). 
 68. Id. § 387.660 (2010). 
 69. Id. § 311.629 (2007). 
 70. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-4971 (2002 & Supp. 2010) (copies of health care records to 
patient or patient’s authorized representative); id. § 59-3075(b)(5) (2005 & Supp. 2010) 
(guardianship); id. § 58-629 (DPA for health care).  Other states with non-differentiating 
statutes include:  Arkansas, ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-46-106 (1999 & Supp. 2009) (patient or 
attorney right to medical record; curiously, guardian omitted from first but not subsequent 
sections of this code provision); id. § 28-65-301 (2004 & Supp. 2009) (duties of guardian); 
id. § 20-13-104 (2005) (durable power of attorney for health care); Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. 
§ 30-5-5-16(b) (West 2009) (designated health care agent); Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
40:1299.58.1 (2008) (DPA for health care; DPA statute for mental health is different); id. § 
28:227(C) (2010); Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1631(3) (West 1999 & Supp. 
2011) (guardianship); id. § 33.26265(1) (West 2011) (access to medical records); id. § 
700.5506(1) (decision-maker for health care); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 8:42-11.2(a)(5) 
(West 2010) (access to medical records); id. § 26:2H-61(a), (e) (patient representative); id. § 
26:2H-110 (mental health representative); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 35A-1241(3) 
(2010) (guardianship). 
 71. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 9419 (Supp. 2010) (access to medical records); id. tit. 14, § 
3069 (guardianship statute); id. tit. 18, § 9702(a)(11) (advance directive statute). 
 72. UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-5-312(2)(c) (2011). 
 73. Id. § 75-2a-117(Part I)(E). 
 74. ALA. CODE § 22-5A-6(d) (2006). 
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making laws are silent about access to medical records75 but the Alabama 
DPA statute provides that the DPA “may, for the purpose of making a health 
care decision, request, review, and receive any information, oral or written, 
regarding the principal’s physical or mental health, including medical and 
hospital records. . . .”76 In Illinois, the default surrogate decision maker 
statute provides that the surrogate has the same powers as the principal with 
respect to medical records77 and the DPA statute provides that the agent has 
the same power as the principal “whether the records relate to mental health 
or any other medical condition. . . .”78  The language in Georgia’s 
recommended DPA form states explicitly that the health care agent “will 
have the same access to [the principal’s] medical records . . . .”79  The 
Maryland statute is to the same effect.80  Mississippi gives DPAs for health 
care the authority to make any health care decisions the principal could 
have made while having capacity,81 including the right to “request, receive, 
examine, copy and consent to the disclosure of medical or any other health 
care information.”82 
Idaho law has even more sweeping provisions about access to medical 
information by the holder of the DPA.  The Idaho DPA form statute provides 
explicitly that the DPA may “[r]equest, review and receive any information, 
verbal or written, regarding [the patient’s] physical or mental health 
including, but not limited to, medical and hospital records.”83  This form is a 
“HIPAA Release Authority” that authorizes release of “all of [the principal’s] 
individually identifiable health information and medical records regarding 
any past, present or future medical or mental health condition” including 
information regarding HIV status, sexually transmitted diseases, mental 
illness, and alcohol or drug abuse.84  As this is a “HIPAA release,” it may be 
 
 75. Id. § 22-8A-11.  The advance directive act does allow patients to limit the decisions 
that a health care agent may make, however.  Id. § 22-8A-6. 
 76. Id. § 26-1-2(4). 
 77. 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/25(e) (LexisNexis 2010). 
 78. Id. § 45/4-10(c)(4) (effective July 1, 2011). 
 79. GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-4 (2009). 
 80. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-603(Part I)(G)(2) (LexisNexis 2009). 
 81. MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-205(2) (2010). 
 82. Id. § 41-41-217. 
 83. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-4510(5)(A) (Supp. 2010). 
 84. Id. § 39-4510(5)(B).  This statute does not apparently recognize the possibility that 
confidentiality protections under the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Act 
(SAMHSA) may be more stringent than those under HIPAA.  See CTR. FOR SUBSTANCE ABUSE 
TREATMENT, SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF ALCOHOL AND DRUG ABUSE PATIENT RECORDS 
REGULATION AND THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE:  IMPLICATIONS FOR ALCOHOL AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE 
PROGRAMS (2004), available at http://www.samhsa.gov/HealthPrivacy/docs/SAMHSAPart2-
HIPAAComparison2004.pdf. 
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meant to be limited to uses and disclosures that HIPAA recognizes with 
authorization, but there is no explicit statement about whether the authority 
would also include psychotherapy notes under mental illness records or 
records of treatment for substance abuse that are protected under the 
federal Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration 
(SAMHSA) regulations.  HIPAA does not require authorization to permit the 
personal representative to have whatever access to medical records is 
permitted by state law, although it should be noted that this “HIPAA release” 
would not meet HIPAA requirements for authorization of a use or disclosure 
of psychotherapy notes.85  Importantly, the Idaho form also invites patients 
to specify any limits on the availability of information, just as they might 
specify limits on the treatment decisions that the DPA might make, although 
this requires explicit “opt in” statement and thus may not be exercised by 
many patients.  The exact language of this invitation reads: “You can also 
include a statement of your desires concerning other matters relating to your 
health care, including a list of one or more persons whom you designate to 
be able to receive medical information about you . . . .”86  
Like Idaho, South Carolina includes a HIPAA authorization in the DPA 
form.87 The form provides access to all medical records, including mental 
health records, with no exception for psychotherapy notes.  The actual 
language of the authorization reads: 
“all individually identifiable health information and medical records shall be 
released without restriction to my health care agent(s) and/or my alternate 
health care agent(s) named above including, but not limited to, (i) 
diagnostic, treatment, other health care, and related insurance and financial 
records and information associated with any past, present, or future physical 
or mental health condition including, but not limited to, diagnosis or 
treatment of HIV/AIDS, sexually transmitted disease(s), mental illness, and/or 
drug or alcohol abuse and (ii) any written opinion relating to my health that 
such health care agent(s) and/or alternate health care agent(s) may have 
requested.”88 
The DPA form invites patients to include any limitations on choices about 
care, but this invitation is silent about inclusion of limits on access to 
information. 
 
 85. 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(b)(3)(ii) (2010) (authorization for disclosure of psychotherapy 
notes may only be combined with authorization for disclosure of other psychotherapy notes).  
These regulations have specific requirements for consent to disclosure, but these do not 
include the HIPAA requirement for separate authorization.  Id. § 2.31. 
 86. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-4510(4) (Supp. 2010). 
 87. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-5-504 (2009). 
 88. Id. 
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C. Increased Access Rights for Principals Extended to Personal 
Representatives? 
HIPAA preemption allows states to implement more stringent privacy 
protections than HIPAA requires.  As described above, this includes giving 
individuals more extensive rights to access their health information than 
HIPAA requires.  One potentially unnoticed consequence of this extension, 
however, is that these same rights may be extended to personal 
representatives.  If individuals are given more rights than HIPAA, and their 
personal representatives are given equivalent rights, the personal 
representative would also have the extended rights.89  A few states have 
statutes with explicit statements that give individuals rights to access their 
health information that extend beyond their rights under HIPAA. 
New York may be one example of this complex interplay.  New York 
grants patients more extensive rights than HIPAA and grants the rights of 
patients to personal representatives, and provides special protection for 
minors from access to their records.  New York gives patients, their 
surrogates, or their legally appointed guardians, the rights to request copies 
of medical records and to obtain access to patient information.90 New York 
also gives “qualified” persons rights of access to medical records, including 
attorneys who hold powers of attorney authorizing access.91 The right 
includes copies of “all x-rays, medical records and test records including . . . 
original mammograms”92 This right also includes psychotherapy notes 
insofar as they are not “personal notes of the said physician or hospital”93 
and thus extends more broadly than HIPAA.94  Providers may also refuse 
access that might “reasonably be expected to cause substantial and 
identifiable harm” to the patient or another.95  New York’s statute granting 
the authority to appoint an agent does not include this restriction, however.  
This statute provides that health care agents appointed by competent adults 
have the right to receive medical information and records “necessary to 
make informed decisions regarding the principal’s health care” 
 
 89. The HIPAA provisions regarding rights of personal representatives as described above 
do not require an authorization as between the individual and the personal representative.  45 
C.F.R. § 164.502(g) (2010). 
 90. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 17, 18 (McKinney 2002 & Supp. 2010). 
 91. Id. § 18(1)(g). 
 92. Id. § 17.  Laboratory tests include, but are not limited to, tests administered in clinical 
laboratories or blood banks.  Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Although New York defines “personal notes and observations” as “a practitioner’s 
speculations, impressions (other than tentative or actual diagnosis) and reminders,” this 
definition cannot be construed to include information relied on for treatment, in which case 
HIPAA would require disclosure. Id. § 18(1)(f). 
 95. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 18(3)(d). 
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“[n]otwithstanding any law to the contrary.”96 A similar right is given to 
statutory surrogates for incompetent adult patients.97  An important limit in 
these statutes, however, is that the right of access is to information needed 
to make informed care decisions. 
Massachusetts may be similar to New York.  Massachusetts provides that 
patients or their authorized representative are permitted to inspect health 
records.98  At the discretion of the psychotherapist, this includes the entire 
record unless it would adversely affect the patient’s well-being.99  In 
Massachusetts, health care agents have the authority to make any decisions 
that the principal can make.100 Health care directives also may include any 
limitations that are to be placed upon the agent’s authority.101  Agents have 
the right to receive “any and all medical information necessary to make 
informed decisions regarding the principal’s health care, including any and 
all confidential medical information that the principal would be entitled to 
receive.”102 As in New York, the right of access is restricted to information 
needed for health care decisions and this may be an important limit. 
Oregon also extends the patient’s rights of access to health 
information103 to include psychotherapy notes.104 Personal representatives 
have the same rights as principles, unless these rights are limited by the 
terms of appointment or by federal law.105  For holders of a DPA for mental 
health treatment, the right to review records is limited to records related to 
the treatment at issue.106 
Except to the extent the right is limited by the appointment or any federal 
law, a health care representative for an incapable principal has the same 
right as the principal to receive information regarding the proposed health 
care, to receive and review medical records and to consent to the disclosure 
of medical records.107 
Under a durable power of attorney for mental health, the attorney in fact 
has the same right as the principal to review medical records, but only that 
related to that treatment. 
 
 96. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2982(3). 
 97. Id. § 2994-d(3)(c). 
 98. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12CC (West Supp. 2003). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. ch. 201D, § 5 (West 2004 & Supp. 2010). 
 101. Id. § 4(iii). 
 102. Id. § 5. 
 103. OR. REV. STAT. § 192.518 (2009). 
 104. OR. ADMIN. R. 847-012-0000(3)(b) (2011). 
 105. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.535 (2009 & Supp 2010). 
 106. Id. § 127.712. 
 107. Id. § 127.535(3). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
388 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY [Vol. 4:371 
Texas may be another example of a state that gives patients more 
extensive rights to disclosure of their medical records than does HIPAA, and 
then extends those rights to personal representatives.  Patients or their 
personal representatives108 are entitled to access to medical information 
unless the physician determines it will be harmful to their physical, mental, 
or emotional health.109  Patients also are entitled to access the content of 
confidential mental health records, unless the professional determines that 
access to the record would be harmful to the patient’s physical, mental, or 
emotional health.110  A guardian has the duty to provide the ward with 
medical care and to consent to medical, psychiatric, and surgical 
treatment.111  There is no statement in the Texas guardianship statute about 
access to medical records or to mental health records specifically on the 
part of the guardian.112  The Texas DPA statute is similarly silent regarding 
access of the holder of a DPA to medical or to mental health records.113 
Nebraska emphasizes the importance for patients to have access to their 
medical records: “Patients need access to their own medical records as a 
matter of fairness to enable them to make informed decisions about their 
health care and correct inaccurate or incomplete information about 
themselves.”114 There is an exception for mental health records if the 
treating provider determines that authorization would not be in the best 
interest of the patient.115  Nebraska makes no statement, however, that 
rights to access mental health records exclude psychotherapy notes. 
Nevada may also have extended rights of patients to access medical 
records beyond HIPAA and, by implication, have extended the rights of 
personal representatives as well.  In Nevada, patients, or representatives 
with written authorization from the patient, may inspect health care 
records.116  DPAs are given the right “to request, review and receive any 
information, verbal or written, regarding my physical or mental health, 
including, without limitation, medical and hospital records . . . .”117 
 
 108. TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 159.005 (Vernon 2004). 
 109. Id. § 159.006. 
 110. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE  ANN. § 611.0045 (Vernon 2010). 
 111. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 767(a)(3)–(4) (Vernon 2003 & Supp. 2010). 
 112. See id. § 767(a) (guardian has a duty to provide ward with medical care). 
 113. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.152 (Vernon 2010) (describing the scope 
and duration of DPA authority). 
 114. NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-8401 (2003). 
 115. Id. § 71-8403(1). 
 116. Id. § 629.061 (2010). 
 117. Id. § 162A.860. 
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D. Restrictions on Access to Certain Types of Records 
Some states have separate DPA statutes for mental health treatment.  
These or other statutes may give special protection from disclosure for 
mental health records.  South Dakota is an example of a state with a 
separate DPA for mental health with separate powers to receive information.  
In South Dakota, patients or their designees have the right to request copies 
of their medical records from licensed health care providers118 or from 
health care facilities, with the exception of chemical dependency treatment 
facilities.119  Patients have the right to execute a DPA to make health care 
decisions on their behalf.120 Holders of a DPA and other persons authorized 
to make health care decisions for others have the same rights as patients to 
consent to disclosure of medical records.121 Providers and facilities are 
insulated from liability for disclosures of medical records when, in good 
faith, they believe that the request for the record is made by an individual 
authorized to request it.122  South Dakota has additional provisions for 
mental health records.  Patients have the right to access their mental health 
records.123  Patients also have the right to execute a power of attorney to 
consent to mental illness treatment.124 In South Dakota, holders of a DPA for 
mental health treatment have the same rights as those they represent to 
receive or consent to disclosure of medical records relating to mental health 
treatment, unless the patient’s declaration of the power limits that right.125  
By contrast, South Dakota’s general DPA for health care does not contain 
the same mention of the possibility that the declarant might wish to limit the 
right to access treatment records.  Similarly, in Pennsylvania, the mental 
health DPA form invites specifications of limits on rights to receive 
information,126  but the general DPA for health care statute does not.127 In 
Louisiana, general DPA powers do not include provisions for restriction of 
access to information128 but DPA powers for mental health treatment do.129 
 
 118. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 36-2-16 (2004). 
 119. Id. § 34-12-15. 
 120. Id. § 59-7-2.1 (2009). 
 121. Id. § 34-12C-6 (2004). 
 122. Id. § 59-7-8 (2009) (requests from attorneys-in-fact or agents); id. § 34-12C-7 
(requests from any person believed to be authorized). 
 123. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 27A-12-26.1 (2004).  There are exceptions for information 
provided by a third party under assurances of confidentiality accompanied with a 
determination that access would be detrimental to the patient’s health.  Id. 
 124. Id. § 27A-16-3. 
 125. Id. § 27A-16-7 (the statute also provides that the right may be limited by federal law). 
 126. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5833(b)(1), (c) (West 2005). 
 127. See id. § 5471. 
 128. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.1 (2008) (general DPA statute). 
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In Colorado, access to mental health records by personal 
representatives is limited.  Although patient records are available to 
personal representatives, mental health records or other records that would 
have a significant negative psychological impact on the patient are excluded 
from this requirement.130  In Iowa, mental health providers may disclose 
information to the spouse, parent, adult child, or adult sibling of patients 
with chronic mental illness when three factors are met, including direct 
involvement in the patient’s care.131 Disclosures are limited to diagnosis and 
prognosis, medications, and a description of the patient’s treatment plan.132  
Georgia has an unusual example of limits on the right to receive mental 
health records in the case of decedents.  In Georgia, estate executors, 
administrators, or spouses (in the absence of the appointment of an 
executor or administrator) have the right to request records of decedents,133 
but this right specifically excludes the right to receive records regarding 
psychiatric, psychological, or other mental health treatment.134  West 
Virginia also limits access to mental health information.135 Indiana similarly 
limits access to mental health information, alcohol or drug abuse treatment 
information, and information about communicable diseases.136 
In Minnesota, personal representatives have the same right as the 
principal to access medical records.137  However, the mental health 
information that can be released to a spouse, parent, child, sibling of a 
patient, or direct care giver is limited.138  Providers must ask patients if they 
agree to the disclosure.139 
E. Recognizing Patient Preferences: Limiting Access to the “Need to Know” 
Several states tie the personal representative’s access to health 
information to the “need to know.”  In Montana, providers may disclose 
health information without a patient’s consent based on the recipient’s need 
to know.140  This would limit disclosures to the information needed to make 
the care decisions at hand.  Patients also may instruct their providers not to 
 
 129. Id. § 28:227(C) (2009) (authorizing access to information regarding mental health 
treatment and mental health records related to treatment). 
 130. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-1-801(1)(a) (2010). 
 131. IOWA CODE ANN. § 228.8(1) (West 2009). 
 132. Id. § 228.8(4). 
 133. GA. CODE ANN. § 31-33-2(a)(2)(A)–(D) (2009). 
 134. Id. § 31-33-4 (Supp. 2010). 
 135. W. VA. CODE § 16-29-1 (West 2011). 
 136. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-39-1-1, 16-39-1-3 (2008). 
 137. MINN. STAT. § 145B.08 (2010). 
 138. Id. § 144.294. 
 139. Id. § 144.294, Subd. 3(a)(5). 
 140. MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-16-529 (2009). 
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make such disclosures.  In Florida, surrogates  have the authority to make 
health care decisions for patients during incapacity141 and the authority to 
access appropriate medical records.142  “[H]ealth care decision” is defined 
to include the right to access all of the principal’s records that are 
reasonably necessary for the health care surrogate to make decisions 
involving the health care of the principal.143 
Limiting access to the need to know sets the default position so that 
personal representatives will not automatically have access to the full 
medical record.  This may be the default position that best reflects the 
preferences of most patients.  It gives personal representatives the 
information that they need to make medical decisions.  It does not give 
personal representatives unlimited authority to see information in the record 
outside of that needed for care.  Although this approach may best reflect 
what patients in general would want, it may not reflect the preferences of 
some patients, who may want their personal representatives to have either 
greater or lesser access to their records.  Montana’s addition of the 
possibility for patients to instruct their providers not to make disclosures 
respects the choices of patients with these different preferences. 
F. Recognizing Patient Preferences: Inviting Patients to Limit the Power of 
DPAs or Surrogates to Access Medical Records 
Some states have DPA statutory provisions that the holder of the DPA 
has the same rights as the patient to access health care information, unless 
the advance directive specifies otherwise.144  These statutes are of the “opt 
in” variety and require positive action on the part of the directive’s maker.  If 
patients are less likely to use “opt in” possibilities than their preferences 
reflect, these options may be underutilized.145  These statutes do, however, 
 
 141. FLA. STAT. § 765.205(1)(a) (2010). 
 142. Id. § 765.205(1)(d). 
 143. Id. § 765.101(5)(c). 
 144. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 13.52.070(a) (2008); CAL. PROB. CODE § 4678 (West 2009); 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2509(a) (2003 & Supp. 2010); D.C. CODE § 21-2206(a)(2) (2001 
& Supp. 2010); HAW. REV. STAT. § 327E-8 (2010); IOWA CODE ANN. § 144B.7 (West 2005); 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-808 (2010); MO. REV. STAT. § 404.840 (2000); NEB. REV. 
STAT. § 30-3417(4) (1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-J:9(II)(a) (2005 & Supp. 2010); N.M. 
STAT. § 24-7A-8 (West 2010) (general DPA); id. § 24-7B-10 (mental health DPA); N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 32A-25.1(a) (2009); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.5-08 (2002 & Supp. 2009); OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 1337.13(A)(3) (West 2004); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5456(d) (West 
2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.10-2 (2008); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-11-1809 (2006); TEX. 
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.157 (Vernon 2011); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 155.30 (West 
2006 & Supp. 2010); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-22-409 (2009). 
 145. For reasons to think that cognitive bias reduces the likelihood that people will use 
“opt in” strategies, see RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE:  IMPROVING DECISIONS 
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 83-87, 108-10 (2008). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
392 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY [Vol. 4:371 
at least point out to people making advance directives the possibility that 
they might want to limit access to their medical information. 
In Utah the advance directive statute requires a “yes” or “no” choice by 
the maker of the directive concerning whether the health care agent has the 
power to access medical records.  This power applies whether or not agents 
can speak for themselves.146  Structuring the advance directive in this way 
does not introduce the possibility of cognitive bias in an “opt in” or “opt 
out” structure. 
IV.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
State laws about the access of personal representatives to health records 
vary widely.  Some states simply assume that personal representatives have 
the rights of principals; others state this explicitly.  Some states expand the 
right of individuals to access their medical records beyond disclosures 
required under HIPAA, without apparently considering whether this 
expanded access applies to personal representatives.  Some states have 
special limits for rights to access certain types of information, particularly 
mental health information, substance abuse treatment information, or 
information about contagious disease.  Some states may reflect patient 
preferences for limits by delineating access on a “need to know” basis, 
unless patients have specified otherwise.  Some states’ advance directive 
statutes invite patients to set limits on access to medical information by their 
decision makers on an “opt in” basis.  One state’s form has a “yes” or “no” 
choice for access to medical records for personal representatives. 
From the point of view of respect for patient autonomy, this situation is 
far from ideal.  It is not surprising however as many advance directive 
statutes were drafted before the quite recent groundswell in support of 
interoperable electronic health records.  In light of this situation, this article 
makes four recommendations. 
First, advance directive statutes should explicitly ask patients to 
designate the extent to which their personal representatives should have 
access to interoperable medical records.  Ideally, the suggested advance 
directive form would identify specific types of information that patients may 
or may not want their personal representatives to see: information about 
mental health treatment, substance abuse treatment, or reproductive history, 
for example.  The form should include options for “all” information, for 
information only on a “need to know” basis, or for no information.  
Structured this way, statutes would bring the issue to patients’ attention.  It 
will require them to make a choice and thus avoid the potential for cognitive 
bias introduced by “opt in” or “opt out” mechanisms.  A form structured with 
 
 146. UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2a-117(2)(Part I (E)) (Supp. 2010). 
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specific choices prompts patients to decide what types of information they 
would—or would not—want to have shared with their personal 
representatives. 
In many circumstances, patients will not have exercised such choices.  
This occurs when personal representatives have been designated for 
individuals, rather than being chosen through the patient’s advance 
directive.  It will also happen when patients have designated their decision-
maker but without specifying authority to access information in their medical 
records.  This last situation arguably is the circumstance with most advance 
directives today: patients are invited to specify the care they would (or would 
not) wish to receive, and to designate their decision-maker for health care.  
They are not, however, reminded that their decision-maker is also most 
likely being given authority to access their medical records or confronted 
with a choice in this regard. 
A second recommendation is, therefore, that in these circumstances of 
absence of choice, the default position should be that personal 
representatives’ access to medical information should take place on a “need 
to know” basis.  That is, personal representatives should have access to 
information in the record that is needed to make care decisions, rather than 
access to the entire record.  Limiting access in this way is most likely to 
reflect what patients would want.  The purpose of a personal representative 
for health care decisions is, after all, to make health care decisions.  These 
decisions should be informed on a need to know basis.  It is unlikely that 
patients understand the design of interoperable records, and it is likely that 
patients would be surprised to find the scope of the information that may 
ultimately be accessible through these vehicles.  Setting the default position 
as “need to know” would thus avoid the surprise of many Mothers about 
their Daughters’ access to their medical records. 
At present, interoperable medical records are not designed to allow 
special management of types of information that patients may regard as 
sensitive.  There is discussion on the federal level of encouraging the 
development of capacities for interoperable health records to incorporate 
information management structures that will better reflect patient preferences 
for the management of designated categories of sensitive health 
information.147  These categories may include psychotherapy notes and 
mental health treatment information, substance abuse treatment 
information, genetic information, information about treatment for sexually 
transmitted diseases, and reproductive information.  The access of personal 
 
 147. See, e.g., Letter from Justine M. Carr, Chairperson, Nat’l Comm. of Vital Health & 
Statistics, to Kathleen Sebelius, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
Recommendations Regarding Sensitive Health Information (Nov. 10, 2010), available at 
http://www.ncvhs.hhs.gov/101110lt.pdf. 
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representatives to health records is an additional reason for encouraging 
this development.  A third recommendation is that as capacities for separate 
management of designated categories of sensitive information become 
available, advance directives should be structured to take advantage of 
these developments. 
Finally, these recommendations should apply both to patients with 
mental illness and to patients with cognitive disabilities.  Despite the 
recognition that some patients have dual diagnoses of both mental illness 
and cognitive disabilities, access to the medical records of these groups of 
patients might seem to raise different issues, a possibility that warrants 
further discussion. 
Patients with personal representatives because of mental illness will have 
at least some mental health treatment records.  As described above, there is 
significant confusion and variation in state laws concerning the rights of 
both patients and their representatives to mental health treatment records.  
Under HIPAA, and in most states, neither patients nor their representatives 
have access to psychotherapy notes.  From the perspective of patient 
autonomy, this limit is difficult to justify.  Leaving aside this more general 
concern, an additional problem from the perspective of autonomy is that 
some state statutes may allow personal representatives the ability to access 
mental health records that patients themselves could not.  If patient 
autonomy is to be given priority, however, patients’ choices about whether 
their representatives should be able to see these records should be honored, 
just as patients’ choices should be honored about other types of records.  
Personal representatives may object that they need access to these records 
to make treatment decisions.  In cases in which individuals have not made 
provisions about their personal representatives’ access to records, mental 
health records would, like other records, be available on a need to know 
basis.  If individuals have specified that they do not want their representative 
to see mental health records, however, autonomy requires respecting this 
restriction—just as it does for other patients who choose to limit their 
representatives’ access to their information. 
For patients with cognitive disabilities, especially if these disabilities are 
longstanding, prior preferences may be difficult to ascertain.  As explained 
above, in these cases records should be available on a need to know basis.  
Personal representatives may argue that the need for protection warrants 
access to certain types of records that patients may consider sensitive, 
especially records about sexual history where there is a risk of exploitation.  
On the default “need to know” approach, these records would be available 
if they are relevant to current decisions about protecting the patient.  The 
only cases in which they would not be available would be cases in which the 
patient has specified in advance either that the representative should not 
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have access to any records, or that the representative should not have 
access to records in a designated category. 
These four recommendations are autonomy-centric.  They give patients 
the right to specify in advance whether their representatives should be able 
to access medical records.  Where patients have not specified, they urge 
access on a “need to know” basis, so that representatives will have the 
information that is relevant to making health care decisions.  They are 
designed to allow those patients who wish control to exercise it.  They are 
also designed to respect what is likely to be the assumption of most patients: 
that they would be surprised to discover that the current power and promise 
of interoperable medical records is not only to improve care, but also to 
open everything to view. 
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